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In many cases, the cost of an agent acquiring information is lower
than that for the principal. However, because of a private beneﬁt dif-
ference between the principal’s and agent’s preferences, the principal
often cannot fully utilize the agent’s advantage. This paper considers
the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing
him/her to report it truthfully. As usual, the larger the private bene-
ﬁt, the larger the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time,
the private beneﬁt may reduce the cost of motivating information ac-
quisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a diﬀerent
preference is desirable.
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11 Introduction
With every technological advance the world grows more complicated. A
decision maker, or ‘principal,’ may no longer have the time or skill to gather
and process information on complex issues. Thus, the principal often hires
an expert, or ‘agent,’ and delegates these tasks to him/her. This delegation
of responsibility may result in some eﬃciency loss. Economists have long
discussed this so-called ‘agency cost,’ which is generally assumed to derive
from existing diversiﬁcation in preferences between the principal and the
agent. In the standard formulation of the problem, it is assumed that the
agent is completely and correctly informed in all relevant details, which
may be a reasonable approximation of reality in some settings. Under this
assumption, the agency cost is simply the cost of eliciting true information
from the agent, and is increasing in the degree of diversiﬁcation. However,
it may be more reasonable to assume that the agent is not omniscient,
and must personally incur some cost to acquire valuable information. For
example, an expert must study consumers’ needs and the expected future
proﬁtability of goods carefully before giving advice on improving a ﬁrm’s
economic performance. The question then is, what kind of agent minimizes
agency cost?
My paper presents an analysis of the properties of agency cost and their
relation to the degree of diﬀerence between the preferences of a principal and
an agent in the presence of information management concerns. A simple
model with one principal and one agent is used. The principal hires the
agent to investigate the potential proﬁtability of a project, which may be
2either good or bad. A good project yields positive proﬁts for the principal,
while a bad project earns negative proﬁts. There is, however, a divergence in
preference between the principal and the agent such that the agent receives
a private beneﬁt whenever the project is undertaken. The information is
assumed to be ‘soft,’ i.e., unveriﬁable by the principal ex ante. Therefore the
principal must design a contract that induces truth telling, since the agent
has an incentive to bend the truth. The principal must further consider how
to motivate the agent to acquire information, since obtaining information is
costly for the agent and information about his/her activity is private.
The ﬁnding in this paper is that incorporating these information man-
agement concerns into the basic model changes the optimal contract. In
the standard formulation, the cost of eliciting true information is always
increasing in the size of the private beneﬁt, because in the absence of other
incentives to tell the truth, the agent always prefers to report that a project
is ‘good’ regardless of his/her actual observation. When the private beneﬁt
is large, it is thus more diﬃcult to induce the agent to report truthfully that
a project is ‘bad.’ In this case, the private beneﬁt has only a dark side.
However, when the cost of motivating information acquisition is consid-
ered, the bright and dark sides of the private beneﬁt are revealed. Because
the information is soft, without actually obtaining the relevant information,
the agent can report a ﬁnding of ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ The larger the private
beneﬁt, the greater the agent’s potential beneﬁt from failing to obtain the
information and giving the project an uninformed evaluation of ‘good.’ On
the other hand, a large private beneﬁt reduces the agent’s incentive to submit
an uninformed report that the project is ‘bad’ because such a report will
3result in the abandonment of the project, and thereby prevent the agent
from receiving a private beneﬁt. In the current model, the constraints of
eliciting true information are satisﬁed whenever the constraints of motivat-
ing information acquisition are satisﬁed. Hence, the agency cost is simply
the cost of motivating information acquisition. In summary, the dark side of
the private beneﬁt is to discourage an uninformed evaluation of ‘good,’ while
the bright side is to discourage an uninformed evaluation of ‘bad.’ When
the bright side of the private beneﬁt overwhelms the dark side, an increase
in the size of the private beneﬁt reduces the agency cost.
The constraint to acquire information and not reach an evaluation of
‘bad’ is binding only when the private beneﬁt is not too large. When the
private beneﬁt is large enough, the liquidity constraint is eﬀective and this
information acquisition constraint is no longer binding. The agency cost is
therefore v-shaped, i.e., decreasing when the private beneﬁt is small and
increasing when it is large.
In principle, the task of information acquisition is allocated to those
whose cost is the smallest. If only an information transmission problem ex-
ists, then the task is delegated only to those whose private beneﬁt is small.
However, decentralization is not uncommon. For example, in 80% of large
Japanese ﬁrms,1 there are unique labor–management relations, called Joint
Labor Management Committees (JLMC). Within a JLMC, which involves
both management and union representatives, basic business policies for so-
cial and athletic activities sponsored by the ﬁrm are discussed. According to
Inagami (1988), a JLMC serves as a place for information exchange about
1Source: Human Resource Management Survey of Japanese Firms.
4basic management decisions; the issues concerning the employer (working
hours, wages and layoﬀs) are discussed with employees, and employee rep-
resentatives even participate in decision making. Aside from JLMCs, super-
visors and employees discuss issues concerning the shop ﬂoor in Shop Floor
Committees (SFC).2 SFCs are aimed at employee participation at the grass
roots level, resolving issues of working conditions at the shop ﬂoor level.
For example, if a labor representative requests air-conditioners for the shop
ﬂoor, then this issue is discussed by the JLMC and the management decides
whether to purchase air conditioners.
Kato and Morishima (2002) reported that participatory employment
practices such as JLMCs and SFCs lead to signiﬁcant productivity increases.
The principal proﬁts from delegating to the JLMC and SFC even if their
interests are not aligned. This phenomenon can be explained by the ﬁnding
in the current paper, that the agent with some private beneﬁt minimizes the
agency cost. Besides JLMCs and SFCs, other recently popular ideas such
as outsourcing, business alliances, networks, team-based production systems
and so on appear to be associated with further moves toward decentraliza-
tion.
I further extend the analysis to incorporate a risk-averse agent. In this
case, as in the risk-neutral case, the presence of a private beneﬁt relaxes
the information acquisition constraint preventing the agent from delivering
a ‘bad’ report. The private beneﬁt now diﬀerently aﬀects the information
acquisition constraint for delivering a report of ‘good.’ The previously de-
scribed tightening of the constraint as in the risk-neutral case still occurs,
2About 40% of Japanese ﬁrms have an SFC.
5but, at the same time, the concavity of the utility function relaxes the eﬀect
of the private beneﬁt. Thus, the constraint is now eﬀectively loosened, and
a large private beneﬁt has a more positive eﬀect for the principal than in
the risk-neutral agent case.
This paper is closely related to other studies on delegation. A stream
of papers, such as Jensen and Meckling (1992), Dessein (2002) and Harris
and Raviv (2005), discuss the cost of eliciting information and the cost of
delegating decision making. Suppose that the agent possesses information
inevitable for decision making. When the right to make a decision is dele-
gated to the agent, there exists a cost such that the agent makes a biased
decision for private beneﬁt. Also, similar to the current model, when the
principal gets advice from the agent there is a cost of eliciting true infor-
mation. Delegation is optimal if the cost of delegation exceeds the cost of
eliciting information. Another stream is represented by Aghion and Tirole
(1997), who discussed the relation between motivation for information ac-
quisition and allocation of decision rights. Because the delegated agent can
choose his/her preferred decision, which may not be the principal’s preferred
choice, his/her marginal return from information acquisition is larger than
that of the nondelegated agent; he/she has a stronger incentive to acquire
information than the nondelegated agent. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between
the incentive to exert eﬀort in information acquisition and biased decisions
from delegation. Delegation is preferred when the proﬁt from the motivating
agent is larger than the cost of a biased decision. In both streams of papers,
unlike the current article, a private beneﬁt in the preference always increases
6all agency costs: the cost of the agent making a biased decision, the cost of
eliciting information and the cost of motivating information acquisition.
Also closely related are papers on the information acquisition and in-
formation revelation problem, for example Prendergast (1993), Lewis and
Sappington (1997) and Cremer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a, b). Unlike the
present analysis, these papers did not relate the agent’s preferences to agency
cost. Only Cremer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a) addressed the issue of agency
cost and the agent’s motivation. In their model, for some strictly positive
range of information acquisition costs, the agent is deterred from acquiring
information under the standard contract, so eﬃciency loss is increasing in
the cost of information acquisition. However, when the cost of informa-
tion acquisition is too high, the principal does not want the agent to acquire
information even though the agent would prefer to do so. This creates an ef-
ﬁciency loss stemming from the prevention of information acquisition, which
is decreasing in the cost of information acquisition. Thus, social welfare is
nonmonotonic in the cost of information acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal incentive scheme and discusses
the costs and beneﬁts of private beneﬁts. Section 4 and 5 extend the anal-
ysis to include unveriﬁability of the state of nature and a risk-averse agent.
Section 6 concludes.
72 The Model
Consider one principal and one agent. The principal and the agent are risk
neutral. The principal has a potential project, which yields a positive proﬁt
when the project is good, or negative proﬁt when it is bad. When the project
is canceled, the principal receives zero proﬁt. The proﬁt of the project is
represented by the state of nature θ ∈ {g,b}; the project is good when the
state of nature is g, and the project is bad when the state of nature is b.
The state of nature is g with probability p, and b with probability 1 − p.
All parties share this common prior. The state of nature is veriﬁable ex
post. However, the principal cannot personally determine ex ante whether
the project is good or bad. The agent, on the other hand, is an expert
and can acquire private information and correctly predict the realization of
the state of nature ex ante.3 To acquire this information, the agent must
exert some eﬀort, incurring a private cost of γ > 0. It is assumed that the
principal cannot observe whether the agent has acquired information or not,
nor what was observed when the information was acquired. Because infor-
mation acquisition is costly, the agent has an incentive to deliver a report
without acquiring information. Furthermore, the agent has an incentive to
falsify the report and maximize his/her private beneﬁt v > 0 if the project
is carried out.
To solve these problems, the principal designs a contract that motivates
the agent to acquire information and report the ﬁnding truthfully. Let ˜ θ be
3The model can be extended to the case in which the agent acquires private information
with probability φ incurring private cost γ(φ), which is an increasing convex function. The
result is an analogy of the current one.
8the report made by the agent. This report is assumed to be veriﬁable ex
post. It is also assumed that the principal has imperfect commitment power,
i.e., the principal can fully commit to the transfer rule but not to a decision
on the project. In this situation, the ordinary revelation principle is not
applicable. However, Bester and Strausz (2001) have shown that a version
of the revelation principle is applicable, and the analysis can be restricted to
the direct mechanism, ˜ θ ∈ {g,b}. The transfer must be nonnegative because
of limited liability.4 Now, the transfer rule is represented by t : {g,b}2 →
ℜ+, contingent on the agent’s report and ex post veriﬁable variables. The
transfer received by the agent must be suﬃciently high to induce the agent
to participate in the contract. The outside opportunity is normalized to 0.
3 The Optimal Incentive Scheme, and the Cost
and Beneﬁt of the Private Beneﬁt
It is assumed that the principal earns a net proﬁt from hiring the agent.
The analysis is restricted to a separating equilibrium in which the principal
undertakes the project only when he/she receives message g.
The optimal contract must satisfy incentive compatibility constraints
in order to guarantee that the agent reports his/her observation truthfully.
Also, the contract must motivate the agent to acquire information. There are
4Limits on penalties are common in practice. See Chung (1992) and Stole (1992) for an
economic analysis on invalidation of a large penalty. If unbounded penalties were feasible,
the principal could extract all rent from the agent and induce eﬃcient behavior by setting
t(g|b) and t(b|g) suﬃciently small. This is a well-known solution for the moral hazard
problem when the agent is risk neutral, legal liability is unlimited and the agent has no
private information about the state of nature before contracting.
9many possible behaviors for an agent who does not obtain any information.
Here, it is assumed that the agent makes up the evidence and reports as if
he/she had actually observed the state of nature. This fabricated report may
be either ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ It is therefore necessary to consider constraints for
both these cases.
Since the principal cannot commit to the project decision, the project
is undertaken only if he/she believes that the state is good. Under incen-
tive compatibility without loss of generality, the principal undertakes the
project only if he/she receives message g.5 Given this ex post optimality
among contracts that satisfy incentive compatibility and induce information
acquisition, the optimal contract is the one that minimizes the expected pay-
ment. The principal’s problem is:
min
t( | )≥0
pt(g|g) + (1 − p)t(b|b),
s.t.
t(g|g) + v ≥ t(b|g), (ICg)
t(b|b) ≥ t(g|b) + v, (ICb)
p{t(g|g)+v}+(1−p)t(b|b)−γ ≥ p{t(g|g)+v}+(1−p){t(g|b)+v}, (IAg)
p{t(g|g) + v} + (1 − p)t(b|b) − γ ≥ pt(b|g) + (1 − p)t(b|b), (IAb)
p{t(g|g) + b} + (1 − p)t(b|b) − γ ≥ 0. (IR)
5There exists another separating equilibrium such that the project is undertaken only
if the message is b. However, this equilibrium is equivalent to the above one.
10The ICθ constraint is the truth-telling constraint for state θ. The IA˜ θ con-
straint is the information acquisition constraint ensuring that the agent does
not beneﬁt from delivering message ˜ θ. IR is the participation constraint.












t(g|b) = t(b|g) = 0.
Proof. First, from the IAg (and/or IAb) constraint and limited liability, the
IR constraint is always satisﬁed.
Second, I show that t(g|b) = t(b|g) = 0. Because these transfers appear
only on the right-hand side of the inequality, the smaller they are the more
relaxed the constraint. It is optimal to set them as small as possible, i.e.,
at 0.
Third, substitute t(g|b) = t(b|g) = 0 into the constraints. Then the
constraints can be rewritten as follows.
t(g|g) ≥ −v, (IC′
g)












11Since γ > 0, the IA′
g constraint implies the IC′
b constraint, and the IA′
g
constraint implies the IC′
b constraint. So only the IA′ constraints are bind-
ing.
Finally, the limited liability constraint gives the remaining conditions.
The IA′
g constraint is a function of t(b|b), not t(g|g), because this con-
straint opposes a ‘good’ message. Suppose the state of nature is g and the
agent sends message g, then the principal cannot know if the agent’s mes-
sage is correct because it is based on information actually acquired or is
simply a correct guess. The principal can reward or punish the agent only
when the state of nature is b. When the message is correct, the agent re-
ceives reward t(b|b), or otherwise is punished and receives t(g|b). The private
beneﬁt between t(b|b) and t(g|b) should be large enough to motivate infor-
mation acquisition; however, t(g|b) is bounded by limited liability. When γ
is large, large motivation is necessary for the agent to acquire information,
hence t(b|b) is large. Because this motivation can be provided only when the
state of nature is b, t(b|b) is decreasing in 1 − p, which is the probability of
realization of b. A similar argument holds for the IA′
b constraint and t(g|g).




p ≥ v. Otherwise, the payment is increasing in v.
Proof. The result is obtained by calculating the principal’s expected pay-
ment. There are two cases. For both cases, the optimal transfers are ob-
tained from Lemma 1.
12First, when
γ
p − v ≥ 0, the principal’s expected payment is:
pt(g|g) + (1 − p)t(b|b) = (1 − 2p)v + 2γ,
which is decreasing in v and e when 1 − 2p < 0.
Second, when
γ
p − v < 0, the payment is:
pt(g|g) + (1 − p)t(b|b) = (1 − p)v + γ,
which is increasing in v.
This result seems contrary to conventional wisdom, which argues that
since the agent prefers to report g regardless of the true situation, the prin-
cipal needs to provide truth-telling incentives when the state of nature is
b. By this argument, the larger the private beneﬁt the more diﬃcult it is
to induce honesty, and therefore the greater the eﬃciency loss. However,
this interpretation holds only when information acquisition is not costly for
the agent. When the principal must motivate information acquisition, this
intuition does not apply because the incentive constraints no longer bind;
only the information acquisition constraints are eﬀective.
The information acquisition constraints are inﬂuenced by private beneﬁt
in the following manner. The agent can deliver either message g or message
b. He/she prefers to deliver message g, because he/she enjoys a private
beneﬁt of v when the project is undertaken. Hence, a large v increases the
incentive to report g, and reduces the incentive to report b. This intuition
is conﬁrmed by the two information acquisition constraints. The right-hand
13side of the IA′
g constraint is increasing in v, while the right-hand side of the
IA′
b constraint is decreasing in v. So a large v is desirable when the eﬀect
in the IA′
b constraint dominates the eﬀect in the IA′
g constraint.
The eﬀect in the IA′
b constraint is realized through t(g|g) and the eﬀect
in the IA′
g constraint is realized through t(b|b). When p is large and the
eﬀect through t(g|g) dominates the eﬀect through t(b|b), the eﬀect in the
IA′
b constraint dominates the eﬀect in the IA′
g constraint.
This is the case only when the incentive acquisition constraints are bind-
ing, i.e., when γ > 0. When γ = 0, the ICg constraint is not binding and,
from the ICb constraint, t(b|b) is increasing in v.
Corollary 1. When γ = 0, i.e., when motivation for information acqui-
sition is not required, the principal always prefers an agent with a small
private beneﬁt v.
One further comment is called for. Note that the source of the private
beneﬁt is either the principal’s beneﬁt, or some source outside the relation-
ship. Suppose the principal loses v when the project takes place, i.e., the
source of the agent’s private beneﬁt is a loss to the principal. Then the total
cost of implementation is:
(1 − 2p)v + 2γ + pv = (1 − p)v + 2γ,
which is clearly nondecreasing in v. This shows that private beneﬁt is de-
sirable only when at least part of the private beneﬁt comes from an outside
source.
143.1 Comparative Statics
It has been shown that the principal’s cost of implementation is nonmono-
tonic in the private beneﬁt v. Here, I describe more carefully the relation
between private beneﬁt and the principal’s cost. Holding all parameters but
v constant, the ﬁgures below show how the principal’s cost varies with the





(1 − 2p)v + 2γ
(1 − p)v + γ
Figure 1: When p > 1
2.
The ﬁgures make it clear that the cost is decreasing in private beneﬁt
only when private beneﬁt is suﬃciently small, or, speciﬁcally, when v <
γ
p.
4 Unveriﬁability of the State of Nature
This section challenges the assumption I have made: ex post veriﬁability of
the state of nature. The basic model is modiﬁed as follows: the realization
of the state of nature can be veriﬁed when the project is undertaken, and
can be veriﬁed with probability 1 > q > 0 when the project is canceled,
15but is otherwise unveriﬁable. Given this ex post optimality, the principal
undertakes the project only if he/she receives message g. In this situation,
the transfers are t(g|g), t(g|b), t(b|q), t(b|b) and t(b|∅), where t(b|∅) is the
transfer when the agent reports b and the principal cannot verify the state
of nature. All transfers are nonnegative because of limited liability. The
principal chooses the transfer rule that minimizes the expected payment
subject to the constraints:
min
t( | )≥0
pt(g|g) + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)},
s.t.
t(g|g) + v ≥ qt(b|g) + (1 − q)t(b|∅), (ICv
g)
qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅) ≥ t(g|b) + v, (ICv
b)
p{t(g|g) + v} + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} − γ
≥ p{t(g|g) + v} + (1 − p){t(g|b) + v}, (IAv
g)
p{t(g|g) + v} + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} − γ
≥ p{qt(b|g) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)}, (IAv
b)
p{t(g|g) + b + e} + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} − γ ≥ 0. (IRv)
As in the basic model, the IRv constraint is satisﬁed whenever the IAv
g
(and/or IAv
b) constraint is satisﬁed. Both t(g|b) and t(b|g) are 0, and because
16they appear only on the right-hand side of the inequality, they can be min-
imized without violating the constraints. Substituting t(g|b) = t(b|g) = 0
into the constraints, I rewrite the equations as follows:
t(g|g) ≥ (1 − q)t(b|∅) − v, (  IC
v
g)
qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅) ≥ v, (  IC
v
b)
qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅) ≥
γ
1 − p
+ v, (  IA
v
g)
t(g|g) ≥ (1 − q)t(b|∅) +
γ
p
− v. (  IA
v
b)
The   IA
v
g (  IA
v
b) constraint shows that the   IC
v
b (  IC
v
g) constraint is not binding
when γ > 0. The   IA
v
g constraint is binding, otherwise one can decrease t(b|b)
or t(b|∅) without violating the constraints. Then, there are two possibilities,
whether the   IA
v
b constraint is binding or not.
First, suppose the   IA
v
b constraint is not binding, then t(g|g) = 0. The
expected payment of the principal is:
pt(g|g) + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} = γ + (1 − p)v,
hence, it is increasing in v.
Next, consider when the   IA
v
b constraint is binding. Substituting the
binding constraints into the principal’s payment yields:
pt(g|g) + (1 − p){qt(b|b) + (1 − q)t(b|∅)} = (1 − 2p)v + 2γ + p(1 − q)t(b|∅).
17It is optimal to choose t(b|∅) = 0. Comparing the optimal payment for
both cases, the   IA
v
b constraint is binding when
γ
p − v ≥ 0. In this case the
expected payment is decreasing in v when p > 1
2.
The above analysis shows that, when the principal can verify the state
of nature with some positive probability, the result in the previous section is
unchanged; the principal’s expected payment may be decreasing in private
beneﬁt. When the principal cannot verify the state of nature, q = 0, the
result is changed. Because the   IA
v
g constraint is still binding, t(b|∅) =
γ
1−p+v
and, from the   IA
v




1−p. The expected payment is
increasing in v.
5 Risk-averse Agent
This section also extends the basic model. Now it is assumed that the agent’s
preference is to be risk averse. The utility of the agent is represented by
u( ). Assume that u′( ) > 0 and u′′( ) < 0. The principal behaves ex post
optimally, and chooses the transfer rule that minimizes his/her payment





pu(t(g|g)+v−γ)+(1−p)u(t(b|b)−γ) ≥ pu(t(b|g))+(1−p)u(t(b|b)), (IA
†
b)
pu(t(g|g) + v − γ) + (1 − p)u(t(b|b) − γ) ≥ u(0). (IR†)
18First, I show that the IR† constraint is not binding. Since transfers are





b) constraints is greater than u(0). Hence, the IR† constraint is satisﬁed,




b) constraints, the expected
utility of the agent from telling the truth, is larger than u(0). Next, I show
that t(g|b) and t(b|g) are 0. These terms appear only on the right-hand side
of the constraints, and therefore should be set as small as possible by the
principal. Substituting t(g|b) = t(b|g) = 0 into the constraints yields:
(1−p){u(t(b|b)−γ)−u(v)}−p{u(t(g|g)+v)−u(t(g|g)+v−γ)} ≥ 0, (IA
‡
g)
p{u(t(g|g) + v − γ) − u(0)} − (1 − p){u(t(b|b)) − u(t(b|b) − γ)} ≥ 0. (IA
‡
b)
Now consider the ICg and ICb constraints. These constraints are not
binding. The proof proceeds by contradiction. First, suppose that the ICg
constraint is binding. Substituting it into the IA
‡
b constraint implies that
the ﬁrst term is negative, while the second term is positive, a contradiction.
Similarly, substituting the ICb constraint into the IA
‡
g constraint shows that





b constraints are eﬀective.
The private beneﬁt v relaxes the IA
‡
b constraint, just as in the risk-
neutral case. In addition, v may relax the IA
‡
g constraint. When v increases,
the ﬁrst term of the constraint is decreasing, tightening the constraint. This
eﬀect has already been seen in the risk-neutral case. At the same time, the
second term of the constraint, u(t(g|g) + v) − u(t(g|g) + v − γ), is decreas-
ing because u( ) is concave; the private beneﬁt reduces the relative cost of
19acquiring information in the constraint.
The expected transfer that the principal pays may be increasing or de-
creasing in v. There is some diﬃculty in undertaking a complete analysis,
so the analysis is restricted to some conditions.






This assumption is met, for example, when u(x) = −e−rx, where r is the
risk aversion coeﬃcient.





b constraints intersect. Then
∂ˆ t(g|g)
∂v < 0 and
∂ˆ t(b|b)
∂v > 0.





b constraints. Let write f1 =
∂f(t(g|g),t(b|b),v)
∂t(g|g) , f2 =
∂f(t(g|g),t(b|b),v)
∂t(b|b) and f3 =
∂f(t(g|g),t(b|b),v)
∂v . Also, g1, g2 and g3 are deﬁned
similarly. Then:
f1 = −p{u′(t(g|g) + v) − u′(t(g|g) + v − γ)},
f2 = (1 − p)u′(t(b|b) − γ),
f3 = −(1 − p)u′(v) − p{u′(t(g|g) + v) − u′(t(g|g) + v − γ)},
g1 = pu′(t(g|g) + v − γ),
g2 = −(1 − p){u′(t(b|b)) − u′(t(b|b) − γ)},
g3 = pu′(t(g|g) + v − γ).



























Because u′( ) > 0 and u′′( ) < 0, ﬁrst:







= sign[g2f3 − f2g3]
= sign[(1 − p)2{u′(t(b|b)) − u′(t(b|b) − γ)}u′(v)
+p(1 − p)u′(t(b|b)){u′(t(g|g) + v) − u′(t(g|g) + v − γ)}







= sign[−g1f3 + f1g3]
= sign[p(1 − p)u′(t(g|g) + v − γ)u′(v)] > 0.
Because the second term of the IA
‡
b constraint is positive, when v goes to
0, the ﬁrst term of the constraint must be positive, then t(g|g) must be large
enough. Also, because the second element of the IA
‡
g constraint is positive,
21the ﬁrst element of the constraint must be positive, then t(b|b) must be
large enough. Then ˆ t(g|g) > 0 when v is small enough, and ˆ t(b|b) > 0. From
Lemma 2, there exists some ˜ v such that ˆ t(g|g) > 0 if and only if v < ˜ v.
Proposition 2. Assume the agent is risk averse and u′′′( ) > 0. The prin-
cipal’s expected payment is decreasing in v when p is large.
Proof. Case 1: when v < ˜ v and t(g|g) > 0.
When u′′′( ) > 0, the IA‡ constraints are quasi-concave. Hence the ﬁrst
order approach is applicable. Let δg and δb, which are nonnegative, be




b constraint. The Lagrangian is as
follows:
pt(g|g) + (1 − p)t(b|b)
− δg[(1 − p){u(t(b|b) − γ) − u(v)} − p{u(t(g|g) + v) − u(t(g|g) + v − γ)}]
− δb[p{u(t(g|g) + v − γ) − u(0)} − (1 − p){u(t(b|b)) − u(t(b|b) − γ)}].
The envelope theorem says that the principal’s expected payment, C, is a




Because t(g|g) is bounded, u′(t(g|g) + v) − u′(t(g|g) + v − γ) is strictly
negative. Then ∂C
∂v is negative when p is large enough.












Figure 2: When v is small and p is large.
Next, assume the corner solution, t(g|g) = 0, then only the IA
‡
b con-
straint is eﬀective. This is the case that p is large. Then t(b|b) satisﬁes






(1 − p){u′t(b|b) − u′(t(b|b) − γ)}
< 0,
because u′ > 0 and u′t(b|b) − u′(t(b|b) − γ) < 0.
Case 3: when v ≥ ˜ v.
When v ≥ ˜ v, only the IA
‡
g constraint is binding. When the solution is a
inner solution, the proof is straightforward from case 1, merely substituting
δb = 0. When the solution is a corner solution, the optimal payments are
23t(g|g) = 0 and t(b|b) satisfying the IA
‡




(1 − p)u′(v) + p{u′(v) − u′(v − γ)}
(1 − p)u′(t(b|b) − γ)
,
by the implicit function theorem. Because u′ > 0 and u′(v)−u′(v −γ) < 0,
∂t(b|b)
∂v < 0 when p is large enough.
In case 1, as in the risk-neutral case, the large private beneﬁt relaxes
the IA
‡
b constraint while tightening IA
‡
g. These eﬀects can seen from δg(1−
p)u′(v) − δbpu′(t(g|g) + v − γ) in the above equation. Thus when p is large,
the eﬀect on the former is greater than that on the latter. Also in the risk-
averse case, the large private beneﬁt relaxes the IA
‡
g constraint, due to the
concavity of the agent’s utility. This eﬀect can be seen by δgp{u′(t(g|g) +
v) − u′(t(g|g) + v − γ)}. Thus this eﬀect is also large when p is large. In
sum, the large private beneﬁt is desirable when p is large.
In Case 2, there is only the eﬀect such that the large private beneﬁt
relaxes the IA
‡
b constraint, due to the concavity of the agent’s utility. In
Case 3, the eﬀect relaxing the IA
‡
g constraint is large when p is large.
Proposition 2 suggests that there exists a case in which the principal’s
expected payment is decreasing in all v when the agent is risk averse and p
is large enough.
6 Conclusion
I have shown that dissonance in preferences between the principal and the
agent can reduce the total cost of information acquisition and transmission.
24The cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and not submit
an uninformed ‘bad’ evaluation is small when the private beneﬁt is large,
while the cost of preventing an uninformed ‘good’ evaluation is large. As a
result, when the agent is risk neutral, the cost has a v-shaped relation to the
private beneﬁt, and a moderate level of the private beneﬁt is cost minimizing.
When the agent is risk averse, the private beneﬁt reduces the relative cost
of acquiring information on the constraint preventing an uninformed ‘good’
evaluation. The cost may be decreasing at all levels of the private beneﬁt.
This ﬁnding provides a new rationale for recent movements toward del-
egation.
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